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This study surveys the security implications of the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and in the 
West African sub-region. It draws on the linkage theory as an explanatory paradigm to examine 
the group’s uprisings on the wider sub-regional security implications. The study finds that the 
resilient and intractable nature of Boko Haram derives from the internal and external linkages and 
material supports the group has been exposed to. The insurgent group, as the study further argues, 
will continue to pose a threat to sub-regional security, as long as, it retains the capacity to withstand 
and defy military containment. Therefore, a more actionable step to take would be for the 
government of Nigeria to go beyond the confines of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) 
to solicit the cooperation of all countries in the West African sub-region to confront Boko Haram 
as a common enemy. 
  




Insecurity is not a new phenomenon to the West African region. In other words, instability and 
conflict have always been a common characteristic in the Westernmost region of Africa, even prior 
to the rise of Boko Haram in North Eastern Nigeria. Examining the challenges to stability and 
security in West Africa, Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka (2015) trace the rise of conflict in the region 
to the early 1960s. Enumerated in their study are the Civil Wars in Guinea Bissau (1962-1974 and 
1998-1999), the Biafran Civil War (1967-1970), Niger Delta insurgency (2004-2009), the Boko 
 








Haram uprising (2009-present) in Nigeria and the Liberian Civil Wars (1989-1996 and 1999-
2003). The Malian Tuareg rebellion/insurgencies (1990-1995 and 2012-2013), the Civil Wars in 
Sierra Leone (1991-2002) and Côte d’Ivoire (2002-2007) are other examples of conflicts in the 
West African sub-region. 
  
The vast majority of those conflicts are intra-state in nature. In the new millennium, the frequency 
of civil wars and large-scale conflicts has dropped significantly in the West Africa sub-region. In 
their place, other forms of violence and new threats have, however, emerged (Institute for Security 
Studies, 2013; Themner & Wallenstein, 2014; Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka, 2015). Examples of 
such new threats range from violent extremism to ethnonational conflict, election-related violence, 
drug trafficking and sea piracy (Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka, 2015). 
  
These new security threats and challenges assume different manifestations in their respective 
countries and environs of origin. In Nigeria, for instance, the emergence of Boko Haram and its 
activities in the North East has continued to change the security architecture and dynamics of the 
country. Partially, the insurgent activities of the Boko Haram group in its operational centers and 
strongholds have also contributed to the instability and security challenges in adjoining countries 
including Cameroon, Niger, Benin Republic and Chad (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 
2017). 
  
This study surveys the extremist activities of Boko Haram and their implications on the security 
landscape of the West African Region. The study draws on the linkage theory as an explanatory 
 








paradigm to unearth the activities of Boko Haram and its implications to the security setting of 
contiguous countries particularly, in Cameroon, Niger, Benin Republic and Chad. It adopts 
a descriptive design and thereby relied largely on textual information from primary and secondary 
sources. The secondary sources include journal articles and book chapters relevant to the subject. 
Giving the chronic nature of the subject, local and international media reports and news were relied 
upon as the primary sources. 
  
Analysing various scholarly works alongside local and international media reports on insurgent 
group, the study attributes the resilience and intractability of Boko Haram to the external links, 
alliances and support base it is exposed to. It is, therefore, argued that Boko Haram as an insurgent 
group will remain a threat to sub-regional security, for as long as it continues to withstand or defy 
local military countermeasures and containment strategies. Insecurity in the Westernmost region 
of Africa will persist, so long as Nigeria is engulfed in the Boko Haram situation. As a regional 
economic power, Nigeria’s stability and security are of strategic interest as much as her safety and 
stability are crucial to the survival of Western Africa. The ever-increasing interdependence and 
blurring demarcations among countries of the region further connote the extent to which the 
security or insecurity of a country partly depends on another. The roving nature of Boko Haram 
and its activities beyond the territories of Nigeria will persist unless the armed group is declared a 
common enemy to the entire region and being exposed to multinational force. 
  
To unpack the central argument of this study, the next section dwells on the background history 
and evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria. It proceeds from that premise to the third segment which 
 








focuses on a theoretical discourse on Boko Haram insurgency and its consequent security 
implications on the sub-region of West Africa. The fourth section examines the group’s activities 
and the local and international responses to it while the last section provides the conclusion and 
policy recommendations.   
2.0 Historical Background and Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria 
 
Boko Haram is an extremist sectarian faction that emerged to correct the wrong teachings and 
doctrines of the Islamic faith and more essentially, to fight against all manifestations of 
Westernisation (The Nations, 2012). Translated, the term Boko Haram denotes that Western 
Education is forbidden and that its influence is considered as a sin, while westernisation is sacrilege 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015). The group emerged as an upshot of a clash between the moderate 
Islamic teachings of Sheikh Jafaar Adam at the Mahammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri-Borno 
State in Nigeria’s North East and the more militant interpretations of the Qur'an by his disciple, 
Mohammed Yusuf who founded the Sect in 2002 (Owolade, 2014; Adetula, 2015). 
 
Influenced by the teachings and doctrines of the Wahhabi Movement, Boko Haram is a Sunni 
Islamic Fundamentalist Sect which advocates a strict form of adherence to the Sharia law and its 
implementation in Nigeria (David, 2001).  Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram 
believed and was inspired to create a new order in which the impoverished should inherit the earth 
(Owolade, 2014). The extremist views held by Yusuf is what led to his expulsion from the 
Committee of Ndimi Mosque in 2002. Later in the year, Yusuf built a Mosque in the North East 
to propagate his own teachings against Western education. His teaching largely attracted many 
 








dissatisfied youths who, having been indoctrinated to believe that Western education is forbidden, 
rejected the Western schools which there were already attending (Owolade, 2014). 
  
As a group, Boko Haram is ideologically not only opposed to Western education, it is also against 
Western culture, its practices and theories. Though Yusuf received training in Western education, 
he was opposed to the theoretical postulation that the earth is spherical. He perceived this theory 
as a sharp contradiction to the teachings of Islam, and therefore, sought after its rejection together 
with the theory of Social Darwinism and the theory which espouses that rain comes from water 
evaporated by the sun (Joe, 2009). With its defined goal to create a hard-line Islamic State 
in Nigeria, Boko Haram is strongly opposed to every element of westernisation of the Nigerian 
society. 
  
The group also holds the belief that the country’s wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few 
political elites in the Christian-dominated South (African Argument, 2015; Batolatta, 2015). 
Became more active and developed into the Salafist-Jihadi group in 2009, the Boko Haram group 
came to be described as a diffused movement whose fighters do not necessarily follow 
the Salafist doctrine (Freedom, 2014; Hayat, 2014). The group denounced members of the Sufi, 
Shiite, the Izala Sects and went on to categorised all moderate Muslims as infidels (Ogunlesi, 
2015).  
  
Though Boko Haram started as a peaceful Islamic anti-corruption group in 2002, it subsequently 
became more radicalized. In July 2009, the group carried out a violent uprising in Maiduguri which 
 








led to a military assault that culminated in the arrest, incarceration and the final execution of its 
leader, Muhammed Yusuf (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2015). At the demise of Mohammed Yusuf, 
Abubakar Shekau assumed the group’s leadership and has since then carried out many deadly 
attacks on schools, churches, mosques, state entities and security forces. 
  
In the last nine years of existence, Boko Haram has evolved from being a local insurrectionary 
group to a terrorist group with international affiliations. Its operational scope has also been 
enlarged beyond the confines of Nigeria. The group’s practice of killing and abducting Nigerian 
nationals and non-national could be considered as an attempt to export its ideologies to other 
particularly, Niger, Chad and Cameroon which have experienced Boko Haram in its cruel form. 
  
Boko Harm has since, established links various terrorist formations and has receiving human and 
material resources support from them. The group is affiliated to such other armed groups as 
the Ansar Dine, al-Quaeda of Mali in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Unity 
and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) (UNSC, 2015). It’s allegiance to the Islamic States of Iraq 
(ISIS), the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and its association with Al Qaida, the 
Organization of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi 
Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) are strong indications of its external expansions and linkages (Elbagir et 












3.0 Theorizing Boko Haram Insurgency and its Security Implications on 
Western Africa 
  
As mentioned in the introduction, countries of the West African sub-region have been confronted 
with political instability, civil wars and insurgencies leading to insecurity. The factors responsible 
for such challenges which different countries have experienced range from organized transnational 
crime to piracy, terrorist activities and election-related tensions (Djinnit, 2013; Marc, Verjee, and 
Mogaka, 2015). 
  
Commonly, border permeability is considered as one of the causes of the security challenges 
countries face. Contributing to the debate on porous borders and the security risk they constitute, 
Aduloji et al, (2014) identify the inability of concerned governments to exercise strict control and 
authority over their borders as part of the main causes of the security dilemma in West Africa. The 
sub-region is classified by Aduloji et al, (2014) as composed of weak and failing states that are 
offering sanctuary for terrorist movement from within and outside the continent. 
  
Adetula (2015) associates the motivating forces behind the rise of ethnoreligious sectarian groups 
to the upsurge in global social movements and transnational processes which accompanied the end 
of the Cold War. His analysis draws attention to the emergence of new migrants and trading 
networks and religious movements with complex organizational structures and institutions that are 
operating across the continent of Africa. Adetula (2015) further affirms that violent ethnic and 
religious conflicts occur in the context of transnational relations in Africa. Examples of such 
conflicts are the Tuareg rebels in the Sahel and the al-Shabaab movement in Eastern Africa. 
 








These ethnoreligious uprisings contribute to the increase in human trafficking, child slavery and 
other transitional or cross-border crimes in Africa.     
  
Nigeria’s Boko Haram could also be said to have been motivated by the global surge in social 
movements and transnational processes which Adetula (2015) has pointed out. This in all 
approximations, may not be far removed from being one of the underlying factors to the rise of 
Boko Haram Sect in North Eastern Nigeria. The trans-border behavioural characteristics of Boko 
Haram, the wider security problems which the frequency of its offensives constitute and the 
consequent local and international responses it attracts could be contextualized and conceived in 
different theoretical perspectives. In this study examines the insurgencies of Boko Haram and its 
broader security ramifications from the standpoints of the linkage theory. 
  
The linkage approach derives explanatory utility in this study for a number of reasons. First, the 
theory is appropriate here for its ability to provide insight on the intricate link between domestic 
and external security issues, arising from the onslaughts of Boko Haram. Second, the theory neither 
contests nor overstress the relevance of national boundaries but rather, unveils the mutual 
interdependence between country borders and complex link between domestic and international 
event. The linkage approach renders visible the external links and implications of the activities of 
Boko Haram. Over the years of active radicalism, Boko Haram has attained international 
recognition as a terrorist group with international allies including AQUIM, MUJAO, ISIS and 
ISIL. These factors collectively underscore the efficacy of the linkage approach as an analytical 
paradigm on this subject. 
 









The linkage paradigm finds its roots in the systems analysis school of thought. Emphasised in this 
theory is the mutual dependence that exists between the domestic and international systems 
(Frankel, 1972). The theory meddles into the link between domestic occurrences and their effects 
on the external environment by taking the spheres of national and international politics as 
interacting systems. This interpretation resonates with Rosenau (1969: 5) who in his words, 
described the linkage principle as ‘any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one 
system and is reacted to in another’. He described the initial stage of the linkage as ‘input’ and the 
terminal stage as ‘output’, which are differentiated according to their origins within the state their 
external environment. 
  
The Input and output are connected by three main varieties of linkages, namely: Penetrative; 
Reactive; and the Emulative type of linkage (Rosenau, 1969). Penetrative linkage occurs when 
members of one polity serve as participants in the political process of another; it is followed by 
reactive linkage involving response and adjustment to polity output emanating from elsewhere 
(Adele, 2013; Adelusi, 2014). Penetrative linkage embraces political, military and economic 
penetration (Aduloju, 2014). Linkage becomes reactive when it is caused by boundary-crossing 
reactions without direct foreign participation in decisions made, while emulative linkage takes 
place when the response essentially assume the same as the action activating it. 
  
The aggressive activities of Boko Haram in North Eastern Nigeria has not only affected the 
security dynamics in Nigeria, also affected by the group’s uprisings is the insecurity it also 
 








constitutes to governments such as Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the Lake Chad Basin. These 
countries are vulnerable to Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram fighters have made communities 
around the Lake Chad basin their hideouts and recruitment grounds (Voice of America News, 
2016). Nigeria’s inability to degrade Boko Haram is what triggered the mutual reaction of 
countries in the Lake Chad Basin to reach an agreement on the formation of the multinational joint 
task force. This illustrates the ‘penetrative’ and ‘reactive’ notion of the linkage theory in which 
this study finds representation. 
 
Increasingly, Boko Haram has become a transnational terrorist movement. Its activities have 
continued to penetrate the fabrics of the society in and outside Nigeria. The permeating nature of 
the activities of Boko Haram provoked the concern of governments of the West African region. 
For example, prior to the formation of the multinational force, the Chadian President, Idriss Déby 
had in 2012, raised concern about the potentials of Boko Haram in terrorizing the entire Lake Chad 
Basin, if not contained. Reactions such as these motivated the mutual agreement to form a joint 
military force to confront the Boko Haram.  The Spill-over effects of the ongoing Boko Haram 
activities on communities of Nigeria’s immediate neighbours in Niger, Cameroon and Chad) have 
been so terrifying.  
  
As the explained in their strategic conflict assessment of Nigeria by the Institute for Peace and 
Conflict Resolution (2017), the insurgent the activities of Boko Haram in the North East affects 
both Nigeria and the proximate countries such as Chad, Niger and Cameroon, as a result of close 
the interactions between them. The linkage approach is thus, deemed appropriate in deepening 
 








understanding of the binary effects of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities on the interactions between 
states in the North Eastern expanse of Nigeria, and among her neighbours especially Chad, Niger 
and Cameroon. Therefore, while Boko Haram aggravates the security challenges in Nigeria, on 
the one hand, it also contributes to the failing security situation in neighbouring countries, on the 
other. 
  
The unpoliced lake, the expanse of land and dense forests and the mountains in the remote parts 
of Sahel region provide safe havens for Boko Haram and others international terrorist 
organizations, to establish links with local terrorist organizations (Aduloju, 2014). These 
ungoverned spaces also make it conducive to criminal activities to thrive (Institute for Peace and 
Conflict Resolution, 2017). This has also contributed to the rise in smuggling of goods, drugs, 
weapons and illegal crossing of non-nationals in and out of Nigeria. The successful attempt by 
Boko Haram to take over the Sambisa forest and made its own territory since 2009 speaks volume 
to the danger such ungoverned spaces constitute to the security of nations in the region.   
  
The increased influx of small arms and light weapons and the unrestricted cross-border movement 
of rebels in and out of Nigeria is also caused by ineffective border policing and long years of 
political instability in the region. High inflow of small arms and light weapons contributes to 
insecurity in the North East and has also endangered the corporate existence of the Nigerian state. 
This is evidenced in the rising tide of armed robbery and other violent crimes in the largely Boko 
Haram-affected North Eastern Nigeria as well as in the situation of insecurity in the border 
communities of Niger, Chad, Cameroon (Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, 2017). 
 









Boko Haram has continued to be a security risk to Nigeria and her neighbouring countries 
particularly, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon within the West African sub-region 
(Adesoji, 2011). The security threat which Boko Haram poses to the rest of West Africa comes to 
the fore, even more, when Nigeria’s geostrategic and economic importance is put into 
consideration. As the largest economy in West Africa, a threat to Nigeria’s national and economic 
security is construed as a threat to the entire Western African community. The leaky borderlines 
connecting and the countries of the region make it easy for the effects of conflict or insecurity in 
one country to spill over to the other. 
  
Whenever Boko Haram attacks escalate, the death toll also increases alongside the rate of 
internally and externally displaced persons. On the hand, the externally displaced population 
overstrain infrastructural facilities in their host countries, while the internally displaced people 
(IDP) also worsen internal security issues at home, as some victims, out of frustration, also take to 
arms and related crimes to fend for themselves. Others become dependants all of a sudden, for 
having been denied their means of livelihoods forcefully.     
  
4.0 Activities of Boko Haram and the Responses  
 
  
Numerous attacks have been carried out by Boko Haram since it became fully radicalized in 2009. 
The group’s activities as surveyed here are not chronological. Attention is drawn only to major 
attacks in and outside the country, for purpose of illustration. Until 2010, attacks by Boko Haram 
 








have been minimal in scale. Large-scale attacks by the groups became more frequent, following 
the Bauchi prison breaks that led to the release of 700 inmates and an attack on a mosque in 
Maiduguri (Sahara Reporters, 2010). 
  
The bombing of the United Nations (UN) Building in Abuja on August 27, 2011 was historic. The 
attack which resulted in the death of 23 people created international concern particularly, giving 
the global significance of the edifice involved. This attack was not considered as an attack on 
Nigeria alone but it was also seen as an attack on the global community (BBC News, 2011). The 
group’s terror campaign and insurgency escalated since then. Attacks on government officials, 
religious leaders, police officers and students intensified in parts of northern and central Nigeria. 
Armed activities by the group became more complicated when Ansaru emerged as a splinter 
faction to kidnap foreigners. The main faction of Boko Haram also began the abduction of 
foreigners. In February 2013, Shekau, the group’s leader, claimed responsibility of kidnapping a 
French family of seven (Smith, 2014).  
  
In April 2014, Boko Haram carried out the abduction 276 schoolgirls from the Government 
Secondary School in Chibok in Borno State, Nigeria (Human Right Watch, 2014). This attack 
attracted sustained international attention to Boko Haram and sparked a global campaign for their 
release. Efforts toward recovering the abductees were met with resistance and hampered by 
corruption. However, continuous efforts finally led to the recovery of 106, while the rest are still 
in Boko Haram’s captivity (Information Nigeria, 2017). Boko Haram was blacklisted as a terrorist 
 








group by the United Nations Security Council al Qaeda Sanctions Committee, following the 
Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction (Clement, 2014). 
  
Boko Haram gained control of swathes of territory in and around Borno state, except Maiduguri, 
in mid-2014 (Blair, 2015). In August 2014, Abubakar Shekau proclaimed a ‘Caliphate’ in the town 
of Gwoza in Borno State (Information Nigeria, 2017). the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in July, 2015 and also changed its official name from Jamā'atu Ahli 
Is-Sunnah lid-Da'wati wal-Jihād (meaning people committed to the Prophet's Teachings for 
Propagation and Jihad) to Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya, in order to designate it as a branch of the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Daily Times, 2015). 
Boko Haram has since spread its tentacles beyond the territories of Nigeria, maintaining 
sanctuaries and recruitment grounds in neighbouring countries (Bureau of Counterterrorism 
2013; BBC News, 2015). The Sect has also infiltrated communities and businesses and has also 
expanded its criminal activities and networks in northern Cameroon, southern Niger and Chad 
(Barna, 2014). The continuous presence of the group in northern Cameroon was proven with its 
attack on the Kolofata military base on January 12, 2015. 
  
According to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) network, Boko Haram attacked two 
Cameroonian villages: Maki and Mada in the Tourou district in the north which resulted in the 
death of a significant number of people and the kidnapping of many children between the ages of 
10-15 (BBC News, 2015). The Chad Republic had two of its police stations in N’Djamena bombed 
by Boko Haram, on June 15th, 2015 and 38 people were killed. The main market of N’Djamena 
 








was also bombed on July, 11th 2015 by a suicide bomber, resulting in the death of 15, with many 
injured (Reuters, 2015). 
  
The resilience which Boko Haram exhibited since 2009 suggested that the Nigerian military lacked 
adequate capacity to dislodge Boko Haram. An ad hoc military coalition comprising troops from 
Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon was constituted by President Goodluck Jonathan’s 
administration to fight the Boko Haram (Lewis, 2015). No significant progress was recorded 
before Jonathan’s tenure ended and President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office in May 2015. 
  
President Buhari’s first action, at his rise to office, was to relocate the headquarters of the Multi-
National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to N'Djamena. The MNJTF is a collaborative initiative of the 
Defence and Military Chiefs drawn from Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Benin in 1998 (New 
Express, 2015; Global Security, org, 2016). With its headquarters at Baga, Borno State in Nigeria, 
the MNJTF has the mandate to fight trans-border crimes in the Lake Chad region. Its mandate was 
expanded to encompass counter-terrorism as an area of focus in 2012. President Buhari’s decision 
and action in moving the command centre of the MNJTF was proceeded by an Extraordinary 
Summit of Heads of States and Governments of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) in 
Abuja, Nigeria (Ugwu, 2015). 
  
Since the beginning of Muhammadu Buhari’s Presidency in 2015, the spate of frontal attacks by 
Boko Haram has dropped significantly but that has not translated into a reduction in Boko Haram-
induced fatality rate. Local and international media reports reveal that the number of attacks by 
 








Boko Haram increased from 127 in 2016 to 150 in 2017, in the same locations (BBC News, 2018). 
A number of such attacks took place outside the Nigerian borders. Specifically, of the number of 
attacks in 2016, 80 took place in Nigeria, 26 in Cameroon, 3 in Chad and 18 in Niger, while in 
2017, 109 attacks were carried out in Nigeria, 32 in Cameroon, 2 in Chad and 7 in Niger (BBC 
News, 2018). The method of attacks in all the locations ranges from armed assault to suicide 
attacks- being the most common type. 
  
The Buhari’s administration is widely claimed to have been on top of the Boko Haram situation in 
Nigeria. But media reports such as cited in the preceding paragraph contrasts this claim. What 
appears to have happened is that there has been a relative increase in political will and in federal 
might in the war against terror (Boko Haram). The insurgent group has experienced increased 
military concentration since the assumption of office of President Buhari. Not only has improved 
military offensives disorientated Boko Haram, but the insurgents have significantly, been pushed 
to the rear. 
 
Notwithstanding the changing position and tactics, the Nigerian Government may not be correct 
in claiming that Boko Haram has been ‘technically defeated’, as it has done severally. Bloody raids 
and suicide bomb attacks by this Islamist militant group still continues. In fact, recent statistics 
point to a steady increase in casualty rate arising from the group’s uprisings is, to say the least, not 
symptomatic of the ‘win’ or ‘defeat’ which the Nigerian government has severally claimed against 
this militant sect. The capture of 110 schoolgirls from Government Girls Science and Technical 
College (GGSTC), Dapchi in Yobe State in North Eastern Nigeria on February 19, 2018 (Sahara 
 








Reporters, 2018; Aljazeera News, 2018) is a strong indication that Boko Haram is still much alive 
and active. With prompt government effort, 104 out of the 110 missing Dapchi schoolgirls have 
been released by Boko Haram; five could not survive the ordeal, while one girl is still being held 
hostage (BBC News, 2018). 
  
In its eight years of existence, Boko Haram has killed a large number of people and has also 
rendered many homeless. Well over two million people homeless; many properties and farmlands 
mainly in the remote parts of  North Eastern Nigeria have also been destroyed (Information 
Nigeria, 2018). The group’s terrorist activities ignite humanitarian crisis and acute food shortage 
which left thousands of people in famine, while many have also become dependent on aid agencies 
for food, water, shelter and healthcare (Information Nigeria, 2018). 
 
The above suffice it to argue that Boko Haram has continued to defy government military 
onslaughts. The group has sustained its survival by its covert means and has tenaciously, resisted 
federal military might. As the foregoing analysis reveals, Boko Haram is not national issue any 
longer. The penetrative nature of the insurgencies of Boko Haram has since remained a threat to 
the security of lives and properties, not only in Nigeria but also to countries within its international 
frontiers. This study derives significance from the transnational forays and penetrations of Boko 
Haram uprising.  
 
In terms of countermeasures, attempts at containing Boko Haram has attracted national and 
international level responses, giving the trans-border or transnational nature of its activities. At the 
 








national level, the Nigerian government came up with the Terrorism (Prevention) Bill, 2011 as 
part of the efforts in tackling terrorist activities. This Bill, signed into law in 2012 was amended in 
2013 to accommodate ways of dealing with other terrorism-related crimes (Terrorism Prevention 
Amendment, Act, 2013)  The Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2013 authorises death penalty for any 
individual guilty of terrorist acts. In giving effect to the central object of the Terrorism Prevention 
Act, 2013, the Goodluck Jonathan’s administration gave unreserved powers to the State Security 
in the fight against Boko Haram. 
 
As part of the anti-Boko Haram measure, the Federal Government also declared state of emergency 
in Borno, Yobe, Plateau and Niger states in December 2011; Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states in 
May 2013, and a military shut down of mobile telephone network in the three North-Eastern states, 
which disrupted the free flow of communication within the group (Jacob & Akpan, 2015). Whereas 
these measures destabilised the group’s effectiveness for a short period, it provoked negative 
reactions from the people of the region, due to the negative socio-economic impact it had on their 
lives (Jacob & Akpan, 2015). 
Similarly, the Nigerian National Assembly also demonstrates its commitment to live up to its 
responsibility, by preparing to act in ways to enhance the protection of the lives of the citizens. 
The highest body of the Nigerian Legislature vouched to ensure the passage of good laws as well 
as carry out effective oversight on government expenditures especially on defence and internal 
security (ICRtop, 2015). 
 
 








Nigeria also collaborated with the United Kingdom on counter-insurgency measures (Premium 
Times, 2013). France’s assistance was also requested in the fight against the group, following the 
Yobe State school attack on February 25, 2014 (IFSS, 2014). The Nigerian government also 
acknowledged the dispatch of a US team to aid the recovery of the abducted schoolgirls by Boko 
Haram in May 2014. The United States, France and China also had their teams on the ground in 
Nigeria to assist with these efforts. 
 
At the regional level, countries such as the Republic of Benin, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, on 
March 5, 2014, signed an agreement with Nigeria on a massive joint offensive against Boko Haram 
(Festus, 2014). The aim of the agreement is to improve the coordination of security, effective 
border policing and exchange of intelligence among states within the West African sub-
region.  Following the signing of the multinational agreement was a meeting of the Ministers of 
Defence from the six countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The meeting which 
took place in Yaounde ended in the signing of the agreement on the establishment a multinational 
force to strengthen security in the region (LCBC, 2014). 
 
Groupings such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) were not left out in the search for countermeasures against Boko Haram. For example, 
the African Union's Peace and Security Council, in January 2015 authorised the MNJTF 
(Aljazeera, 2015). Under the auspices of the AU, African leaders also agreed to send 7,500 troops 
to fight the Boko Haram insurgency Nigeria. The decision to create MNJTF was strongly 
supported by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).   
 









In the same way, the ECOWAS also issued a statement condemning the activities of Boko Haram. 
ECOWAS (2014) identified proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SLAW) as the root 
cause of insecurity caused by Boko Haram and also affirmed the need for collaborative efforts in 
ending terrorism in the region. In March 2014, the ECOWAS’ Commissioner for Political Affairs, 
Peace and Security confirmed the partnership between ECOWAS, the UN and the Nigerian 
government to embark on a new Weapon Collection Programme for Northern Nigeria (Iroegbu, 
2014). This measure was adopted as part of the more concrete steps towards overcoming Boko 
Haram.   
 
The Boko Haram insurgency has also attracted responses from the wider international community. 
These encompass efforts by the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the UNSC. It is believed 
by the ICC that the Nigerian military and the extremist Boko Haram have committed possible 
crimes against humanity and war crimes in the past years of insurgencies in the North East region 
(Nicholas, 2015). According to the ICC’s Preliminary Examination Report on Nigeria, the 
Prosecutor’s office finds the Nigeria Military and the Boko Haram wanting on eight identified 
possible cases of crimes against humanity and war crimes under Article 7 and 8 of the Rome 
Statute (Nicholas, 2015). The ICC declared Boko Haram to have committed crime against 
humanity on the grounds of the random attacks it unleashes on the civilian population. Such attacks 
include those carried out against civilians through suicide bombs and in the course of its raids on 
towns and villages. According to the report: 
 








‘From January 2013 to March 2015, 356 reported incidents of killings can be 
attributed to Boko Haram in Borno, Adamawa, Yobe, Plateau, Kano, the Federal 
Capital Territory (Abuja), Gombe, Kaduna, Bauchi in Nigeria...occasionally in 
Cameroon (since February 2013) and Niger (Dumba and Diffa, since January 
2015) which led to the killing of over 8,000 civilians, and “Following military 
operations since February 2015 during which territory previously held by Boko 
Haram was recaptured, mass graves or other sites with decomposed bodies were 




The ICC recorded 55 incidents of abductions committed by the Islamist sect involving not less 
than 1,885 abductees from Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States, between January 2014 and March 
2015; in 2014 alone 1,123 people were abducted, 536 of the abductees were female (Nicholas, 
2015). The Islamic sect is also alleged to have detained thousands of civilians in the Sambisa 
Forest, the Lake Chad area, and near the Gorsi mountains in Cameroon (Nicholas, 2015). The 
group is also alleged to have held Hundreds of men and finally executed them. The Court explains 
that any crimes committed by the Nigerian Army would also fall under its scrutiny. Once again, 
Nigeria is reminded of its obligation for being a State Party to the Rome Statute, the fact that 
crimes of grave consequence to the conscience of humanity do not go unpunished (Star Africa, 
2014).   
  
In several international fora, the UN has also condemned the activities of Boko Haram. The Ban 
Ki-Moon-led UN also expressed solemn concern about the rising spate of violent crimes in 
Nigeria. The UN further called on all political and religious leaders to work together to address 
the root causes of the recurrent sectarian violence in the country and consciously pursue the part 
of peace.   
 










The Boko Haram insurgency has negatively impacted on the security of North Eastern geopolitical 
zone and the Nigerian state at large. The crisis has continued to constitute the challenge to the 
effectiveness of key policies and programmes. For example, at the end of the Nigerian Civil War 
(1967-1970), the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) was established by decree No.24 of 22nd 
May 1973 (NYSC, 2018). Aimed at reconstructing, reconciling and rebuilding the country, the 
NYSC was created also to promote national unity through the development of common ties among 
Nigerian youths. 
 
The idea of the NYSC programme was to deploy corps members (who are usually university 
degree holders or its equivalent) to regions other than theirs to offer one year of compulsory service 
to the nation. Other than compulsory once service, the underlying notion of the NYSC programme 
is to forge national unity, after the bloody civil. The NYSC was borne out of the need to assure 
Nigerians about the newfound peace and unity, after the Civil War and to demonstrate the 
assurance that they can reside anywhere in the country, regardless of religion or ethnic group. This 
well-intended policy and programme of government though still functional in the country has been 
impeded especially, in North Eastern Nigeria, due to insecurity.  
 
With its barefaced opposition to Western education and Christendom, Boko Haram has continued 
to endanger the oneness of the Nigerian state by deepening the religious divide among people of 
different faith and even in its own belief. Effects of the Boko Haram insurgency also manifest in 
 








ethnoreligious dimensions in the context of people-to-people conflict, albeit not very noticeable. 
Since its emergence in 2009, Boko Haram has been hostile to the stability and security of the 
Nigerian state, its adjoining countries and the West Africa region at large. However, no effort has 
been made to tackle Boko Haram as a problem of the entire region of West Africa. The so call 
Multi-National Joint Task Force that is in place comprises of Military units from Nigeria, Chad, 
Benin and Cameroon and Niger, to the exclusion of 10 countries which together, makes the 15 
countries West Africa is composed of.  
6.0 Policy Recommendations 
 
To address the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the following recommendations are suggested. 
First, it is observed that the 15 countries in West African have a shared history and geography. 
Implied in this is that what affect one country in the sub-region has the possibility of affecting the 
others, giving their geographical nearness to one another. It is incumbent on national governments 
of the region therefore, to forge greater collaboration in improving border management 
and administration. Nigeria should take the initiative by drawing the attention of states within the 
West African sub-region to the need for promoting and consolidating a people-oriented 
comprehensive regional integration process. 
 
Second, the five-member state Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) should be empowered 
with the required human and material resources to manage to manage the insurgency. Countries: 
Chad, Niger, Cameroon, Benin and Nigeria which constitute the MNJTF should demonstrate the 
political will to keep to the rules of engagement on the MNJTF agreement, as that would be crucial 
 








to the success of the task force. The MNJTF should also be sustained to prevent Boko Haram from 
regenerating itself. 
  
Third, the government of Nigeria and that of the MNJTF countries should pay more attention to 
the global and regional tide of terrorism and identify their connections to local extremism. This 
will enable governments to detect early warning signs and take precautionary measures against 
any possible uprising. 
  
Four, steps should be taken by the government to use the appropriate faith-based organizations to 
constantly readdress the ideological and religious perversions which Boko Haram has created, to 
redirect the perverted back to the genuine religious teachings. This will reduce the surge of 
radicalization in the society.    
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